EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Bilateral information disclosure in adverse selection markets with nonexclusive competition

Andrew Kosenko, Joseph Stiglitz and Jungyoll Yun

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023, vol. 205, issue C, 144-168

Abstract: We study insurance markets with nonexclusive contracts, introducing bilateral endogenous information disclosure about insurance sales and purchases by firms and consumers. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists under remarkably mild conditions and characterize the unique equilibrium allocation. With two types of consumers the allocation consists of a pooling contract that maximizes the well-being of the low-risk type (along the zero-profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high-risk type to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and constrained Pareto efficient. Consumer disclosure and asymmetric equilibrium information flows are critical in supporting the equilibrium.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Nonexclusivity; Nonexclusive competition; Rothschild–Stiglitz; Asymmetric information; Verifiable disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268122003663
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Bilateral Information Disclosure in Adverse Selection Markets with Nonexclusive Competition (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:205:y:2023:i:c:p:144-168

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.015

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-23
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:205:y:2023:i:c:p:144-168