Persistence of incumbents and female access to political positions

Quentin Lippmann

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023, vol. 206, issue C, 327-349

Abstract: This article studies whether the incumbent advantage for reelection reduces female access to political positions. I use a regression discontinuity exploiting close electoral races in French municipalities to randomize the eligibility of incumbent mayors for reappointment. After a male incumbent, I show that incumbency largely reduces the stock of places where women have historically been appointed mayor by about 24%. After a female incumbent, I find that there are fewer women appointed mayor than after a male one. I investigate the mechanisms and argue that this effect is consistent with a backlash or stereotype threat effect penalizing women after a female incumbent.

Keywords: Gender; Elections; Incumbency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:206:y:2023:i:c:p:327-349

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.12.015

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