Cooperation in indefinite games: Evidence from red queen games

Andrew Smyth and Cortney S. Rodet

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023, vol. 208, issue C, 230-257

Abstract: We test whether the length of an indefinite horizon, or that the horizon is indefinite as opposed to finite, affects cooperation in repeated 3×3Red Queen Games. With our participant population, and our experimental program and procedures, the length of the indefinite horizon significantly affects cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It also significantly affects cooperation in the Red Queen Game, but only after participants are experienced. The indefiniteness of the horizon does not significantly affect cooperation in either game. Our results highlight the importance of experience for cooperation in indefinite games with even slightly larger strategy spaces than the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Keywords: Repeated games; Cooperation; Learning; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Red Queen Game; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:208:y:2023:i:c:p:230-257

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.02.001

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