 A model of voting with motivated beliefsJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023, vol. 213, issue C, 394-408 Abstract: This paper develops a theory in which heterogeneity in political preferences produces a partisan disagreement about objective facts. A political decision involving both idiosyncratic preferences and scientific knowledge is considered. Voters form motivated beliefs in order to improve their subjective anticipation of the future political outcome, which is determined by two-party competition à la Downs (1957). We provide conditions on preferences under which equilibrium beliefs are monotone along the political spectrum, as voters tend to deny the scientific arguments advocating the political orientations that run counter to their interests. Collective denial is the strongest in societies where contingent policy is the least likely to be implemented. Political competition does not imply policy convergence, as there exists an equilibrium in which each party targets a different group of voters as a function of their (endogenous) level of denial. Keywords: Ideology; Motivated cognition; Partisan disagreement; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:213:y:2023:i:c:p:394-408 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.031 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D. More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.