Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine

Klaus W. Deininger, Daniel Ayalew Ali and Roman Neyter

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023, vol. 213, issue C, 432-450

Abstract: We analyze the impact of a 2021 reform in Ukraine that—after earlier digitization efforts did not produce desired results—mandated use of transparent online auctions by local governments rather than a central agency to lease rights to public agricultural land. The shift to a collusion-proof electronic auction system increased lease revenue by 175% for our preferred specification. Had all public land that Ukraine transferred since 2015 been auctioned using post-reform mechanisms, local governments would receive incremental lease revenue of US$500 million per year for the duration of the lease. Where public land is important, reforms to ensure rights to such land are allocated transparently, competitively and in a decentralized way could improve social, economic, and environmental outcomes.

Keywords: Ukraine; Auctions; Public land; Governance; Decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:213:y:2023:i:c:p:432-450

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.029

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