Conflict in the pool: A field experiment

Loukas Balafoutas, Marco Faravelli, Helena Fornwagner and Roman Sheremeta

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023, vol. 215, issue C, 60-73

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor's valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer's propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity and decreases in the actor's valuation. We complement the results with survey evidence.

Keywords: Conflict; Valuations; Scarcity; Field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:215:y:2023:i:c:p:60-73

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.08.028

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