Market value of rarity: A theory of fair value and evidence from rare baseball cards
Soroush Ghazi and
Mark Schneider
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 219, issue C, 318-339
Abstract:
We investigate the market value of rarity theoretically and empirically. Prior studies find that the market value of rarity follows a power law, but this finding lacks a theoretical foundation. We provide a micro-foundation for this finding, demonstrating that the observed power law emerges in a competitive market where agents have rank-dependent utility preferences. The model leads to two new theoretical insights: (i) the rank of an item within a set of close substitutes and the quantity of that item known to exist are both natural measures of rarity, but rank is predicted to perform better; (ii) there is a systematic relationship between the estimated slope and intercept from a regression of log price on log rank. When we test the model on data from over 4000 auction records of rare baseball cards, we find that a regression with only log rank and grading company explains 60% of the variation in log price.
Keywords: Rarity; Rank dependent utility; Baseball cards; Power laws; Zipf's law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:219:y:2024:i:c:p:318-339
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.016
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