Territory in the state of nature

Jordan Adamson and Bart Wilson

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 219, issue C, 490-509

Abstract: In this paper we examine territorial behavior in the ecological conditions that foster conflict. We develop an economic model that isolates the effects of resource skew on territorial ranges, as well as their interactions with unequal appropriation abilities. We then conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the predictions of our model and find that observed behavior tends to cluster around the equilibrium predictions and that all comparative statics have the predicted sign. Additionally, we find that equally strong appropriators select more exclusive and less overlapping ranges than what is predicted with symmetric resources, while weaker appropriators choose more engulfed ranges than what is predicted with skewed resources.

Keywords: Territorial range; Resource concentration; Strength asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D74 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:219:y:2024:i:c:p:490-509

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.032

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