 Allocating vehicle registration permitsMassimiliano Landi and Domenico Menicucci Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 221, issue C, 327-349 Abstract: We compare social welfare, consumer surplus and profits in two different institutional settings in which an item whose quantity is fixed and controlled (vehicle registration permit) is allocated to the buyers of a complementary good (car). In the first setting, which resembles the way in which vehicle registration permits are allocated in Singapore, the central planner runs a uniform price auction for permits in which the consumers who bid the highest receive the permits and pay the highest losing bid. Then each winning consumer purchases a car from a seller. In the alternative setting, the central planner first allocates the permits to sellers and then sellers offer to consumers bundles, each consisting of a car and a permit. For two different models of product differentiation, we find that social welfare is greater when permits are auctioned to consumers, but consumers and sellers generally prefer the alternative setting. Keywords: Auctions; Posted prices; Driving permits (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:221:y:2024:i:c:p:327-349 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.020 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D. More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier |
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