The evolution of collective choice under majority rules

Akira Okada and Ryoji Sawa

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 225, issue C, 290-304

Abstract: A collective choice (or opinion) supported by a majority of individuals is challenged recurrently by a new one in a society. We consider a long-run evolution of collective choice under majority rules by stochastic evolutionary game theory. The Condorcet winner is uniquely a long-run equilibrium for all (super-)majority rules. When the Condorcet winner does not exist, the long-run equilibria under all majority rules belong to the top cycle set. In a multidimensional choice problem where the top cycle set tends to become the whole policy space, a long-run equilibrium belongs to the min–max policy set if the core is non-empty. We show that stochastic evolutionary game theory can mitigate the indeterminacy problem in social choice.

Keywords: Collective choice; Voting; Stochastic evolutionary game theory; Condorcet winner; Top cycle set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:225:y:2024:i:c:p:290-304

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.039

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