Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India

Farzana Afridi, Sourav Bhattacharya, Amrita Dhillon and Eilon Solan

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition.

Keywords: Corruption; Electoral competition; Uncertainty; Audit; Accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 H75 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124002385

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.018

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