Strategy assortativity and the evolution of parochialism

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli and Alessandro Tampieri

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of strategy assortativity for the evolution of parochialism. Individuals belonging to different groups are matched in pairs to play a prisoner’s dilemma, conditioning their choice on the identity of the partner. Strategy assortativity implies that a player is more likely to be matched with someone playing the same strategy. We find that, if the degree of strategy assortativity is sufficiently high, then parochialism (i.e., cooperate with your own group and defect with others) spreads over a group, while egoism (i.e., defect with everyone) emerges otherwise. Notably, parochialism is more likely to emerge in smaller groups.

Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma; Cooperation; In-group favoritism; Cultures; Asymptotic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism (2022)
Working Paper: Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism (2022)
Working Paper: Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124002981

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106692

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