In pursuit of power: Land tenancy contracts and local political business cycles in Indonesia
Takashi Kurosaki,
Saumik Paul and
Firman Witoelar
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 227, issue C
Abstract:
This study examines whether strategic delegation of land tenancy contracts is linked to local-level political business cycles in the context of a village institution – bengkok land – prevalent since the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Bengkok land refers to communal village land that incumbent village heads receive usufruct rights over until their term in the office ends. We test whether incumbent village heads utilize time-bound access to bengkok land for political consolidation. Based on a novel cross-sectional household survey fielded in 2018 across 130 Javanese villages, we find robust evidence of a positive correlation between the percentage of total tenancy contracts as sharecropping and proximity (before or after) to the village election. As vulnerability of the sharecroppers makes them a pro-poor target for the incumbent village heads, these results implicate political capture.
Keywords: tanah bengkok; Political business cycle; Clientelism; Land tenancy; Electoral competition; Indonesia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 H83 O17 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124003780
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106764
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