Multitasking and leadership in optimal incentive contracts

Kohei Daido and Takeshi Murooka

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 229, issue C

Abstract: We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers (e.g., another agent, a third party, or a principal) who also contribute to this task. The agent’s effort can serve as a signal of the value as in the literature on leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998). We derive the condition in which the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task to mitigate the agent’s excessive signaling.

Keywords: Multitasking; Signaling; Leadership; Help (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:229:y:2025:i:c:s0167268124004384

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106824

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