Behavioral subgame perfect implementation

Makoto Hagiwara

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 233, issue C

Abstract: We examine implementation problems in settings where individuals’ choice behavior may not be rational and sequential game forms are considered. First, we present an example in which a social choice rule that is not implementable in “behavioral” Nash equilibria (Proposition 6 in de Clippel (2014)) can be implemented in behavioral subgame perfect equilibria using a three-stage game form. Subsequently, we explore the use of sequential game forms in general implementation problems and provide a necessary condition and two sufficient conditions for implementability in behavioral subgame perfect equilibria.

Keywords: Behavioral implementation; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D60 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:233:y:2025:i:c:s016726812500112x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106992

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