Jumping the queue: An experimental study on cultural differences in bribing attitudes among Greeks and Germans

Alexandros Karakostas, Veronika Grimm and Andreas Drichoutis

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 235, issue C

Abstract: We examine how queuing processes in public service provision influence individuals' propensity to engage in bribery. We introduce the queue-jumping game, distinguishing between queue-jumping bribes (to advance one's position) and counter-bribes (to maintain one's position when threatened by queue-jumping). Participants from Greece and Germany, countries with different levels of perceived corruption, played the game in monocultural and intercultural groups. Our findings reveal that in monocultural settings, Greek participants initially exhibited higher bribery rates than German participants, driven primarily by more frequent queue-jumping. However, these cultural differences diminished over repeated interactions, suggesting strategic adaptation. Crucially, analysis indicates that bribing to queue-jump incurs a substantially higher moral cost than counter-bribing for both nationalities. Furthermore, Greek participants perceived counter-bribing as significantly more socially inappropriate than their German counterparts, helping explain the higher initial rates of queue-jumping among Greek participants. In intercultural groups, we found only limited evidence of minority participants adjusting behavior towards majority norms, although minorities consistently earned less regardless of nationality.

Keywords: Antisocial behavior; Bribery; Corruption; Cross-country experiment; Cultural differences; Queue-jumping; Inter-country experiment; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 C92 D62 D73 H49 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:235:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125001647

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107045

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