Government transparency and tax compliance: Evidence from an artefactual experiment supplemented with administrative data

Trent McNamara and Roberto Mosquera

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 236, issue C

Abstract: Effective tax policy requires understanding behavioral decision-making. We investigate reciprocity and whether misperceptions about how the government allocates funds impacts taxpaying behaviors. In an artefactual survey experiment supplemented with administrative tax payment data from 2,000 self-employed workers, preferences and beliefs on government spending are elicited. In the case when revealing the actual distribution improves beliefs relative to preferences, government support increases (0.30 s.d.), views on taxes improve (0.24 s.d.), and affective polarization decreases (0.40 s.d.). However, there is no effect on reported income tax. When beliefs are worsened relative to preferences, there is no significant response on stated outcomes, but we find an increase in reported income tax.

Keywords: Tax morale; Information intervention; Natural experiment; Artefactual experiment; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D83 D90 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:236:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125001611

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107042

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