Selective exposure reduces voluntary contributions: Experimental evidence from the German Internet Panel

Federico Innocenti and Linnéa Marie Rohde

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 236, issue C

Abstract: Can strategic information acquisition harm the provision of a public good? We investigate this question in an incentivized online experiment with a large sample of the German population. The marginal returns of the public good are uncertain: it is either socially efficient to contribute or not. In the information treatment, participants can choose between two information sources with opposite biases: one source is more likely to report low marginal returns, whereas the other is more likely to report high marginal returns. We find that information avoidance is a minor phenomenon. Most participants select the source biased towards reporting low marginal returns, independent of their prior beliefs. As a result, the information treatment reduces contributions and increases free-riding. We find that social preferences guide information acquisition: selfish participants are less likely to acquire information, and if they acquire information, they are more likely to select the source biased towards reporting high marginal returns.

Keywords: Experiment; Limited attention; Media bias; Public good; Selective exposure; German Internet Panel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C99 D12 D61 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:236:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125002008

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107081

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