Optimal reimbursement schemes in contests
Subhasish M. Chowdhury,
Chen Cohen,
Roy Darioshi and
Shmuel Nitzan
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 237, issue C
Abstract:
Many contests, such as innovation races or sport competitions, often involve reimbursement of expenses. This study examines optimal reimbursement schemes in two-player Tullock contests, analyzing six reimbursement structures: external versus internal funding source each targeting the contest winner, the loser, or both of them. We assess the implications on effort, winning probabilities, and designer payoff under three key conditions: full-reimbursement, neutrality (preserving initial win chances) and viability (positive efforts from players). We find that all the schemes can satisfy viability; and all the schemes except for external reimbursement to the winner can satisfy neutrality. Additionally, all the schemes except internal reimbursement to the winner, and internal or external reimbursement to both players can satisfy full-reimbursement. These findings indicate that optimal reimbursement structures and rates vary depending on the contest structure, and the designer’s objectives, such as maximizing effort or maximizing personal payoff.
Keywords: Contest; Reimbursement scheme; R&D; Tullock (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K41 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268125002823
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:237:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125002823
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107163
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.
More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().