The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs: an experimental analysis
Ananish Chaudhuri ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1998, vol. 37, issue 3, 291-304
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Working Paper: The Ratchet Principle in a Principal Agent Game with Unknown Costs: An Experimental Analysis (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:37:y:1998:i:3:p:291-304
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