EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Asymmetric information and excessive budgets in government bureaucracies: A principal and agent approach

Barbara Spencer ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1982, vol. 3, issue 2-3, 197-224

Date: 1982
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0167-2681(82)90018-X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:3:y:1982:i:2-3:p:197-224

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2022-01-06
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:3:y:1982:i:2-3:p:197-224