Networks and clubs

Frank Page and Myrna Wooders

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2007, vol. 64, issue 3-4, 406-425

Abstract: We formulate a club model where players' have identical single-peaked preferences over club sizes as a network formation game. For situations with "many" clubs, we provide necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the farsighted core and the direct (or myopic) core. With "too few" clubs, if players are farsighted then the farsighted core is empty. In this same case, if players are myopic then the direct core is always nonempty and, for any club network in the direct core, clubs are of nearly equal size (i.e., clubs differ in size by at most one member).

Keywords: Clubs; Network; formation; games; Path; dominance; core; Nash; club; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:64:y:2007:i:3-4:p:406-425

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