On the elements and practices of monitoring

Der-Yuan Yang

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, vol. 65, issue 3-4, 654-666

Abstract: Politicians and businessmen have to address the principal-agent problem whenever delegation of power occurs. Installing a monitoring scheme may help to ensure that the officers perform the desired functions. Checks and balances are the theme in the political arena, while management and control are the routines in the business world. Throughout history numerous monitoring networks have been deployed to overcome the difficulties. Comparing how those monitoring networks solved the controlling issues may shed light on the incentive structures embodied. Furthermore, the evolution of institutions and organizations could be discerned via the changes in incentives.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:65:y:2008:i:3-4:p:654-666

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