Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems

Hans Gersbach and Verena Liessem

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, vol. 68, issue 2, 401-411

Abstract: We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency. The incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self-financing across terms.

Keywords: Elections; Incentive; contracts; Multi-task; problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:68:y:2008:i:2:p:401-411

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