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The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction

David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, William Shobe (), Vernon Smith and Abel Winn

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009, vol. 69, issue 2, 190-200

Abstract: We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential English clock (SEC) auction, and a combinatorial English clock (CEC) auction. We find the SEC and CEC mechanisms to be superior the CSB when demand is relatively elastic.

Keywords: Tradeable; emission; allowances; Combinatorial; auctions; Experimental; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:69:y:2009:i:2:p:190-200