Rent a womb: Surrogate selection, investment incentives and contracting

Swapnendu Banerjee (Bandyopadhyay) and Sanjay Basu

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009, vol. 69, issue 3, 260-273

Abstract: We develop a model of gestational surrogacy, in which a childless couple faces heterogeneous prospective surrogates. High-type surrogates add more value but also have higher outside options. Surrogates can make specific investments for the overall well-being (care) of the unborn child. We show that, under noncontractibility, surrogates invest less (take less care) than the first-best. Couples are also more likely to choose low-type surrogates, who need less compensation for foregoing cheaper outside options. Hence the popular practice of making surrogacy contracts unenforceable might put the unborn child at risk.

Keywords: Surrogate; Intended; parents; Noncontractibility; Under-investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rent a Womb: Surrogate Selection, Investment Incentives and Contracting (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:69:y:2009:i:3:p:260-273

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