Matching contributions and the voluntary provision of a pure public good: Experimental evidence

Ronald Baker, James Walker and Arlington Williams

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009, vol. 70, issue 1-2, 122-134

Abstract: Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lump-sum matching are significantly higher and have significantly lower within-group dispersion relative to one-to-one matching and two baseline settings without external matching funds. In addition, a comparison of the two baseline conditions reveals a positive framing effect on public goods allocations when it is explicitly revealed to subjects that an outside source has made an unconditional allocation to the public good.

Keywords: Laboratory; experiments; Public; goods; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Working Paper: Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:70:y:2009:i:1-2:p:122-134

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