Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

Dimitrios Diamantaras and Robert P. Gilles

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011, vol. 80, issue 1, 210-222

Abstract: In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.

Keywords: Common resource game; Pollution abatement; Environment; Ambiguity; Social opinion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 D74 D81 H49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:1:p:210-222

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.03.008

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