Do we need a distinct monetary constitution?

Steven Horwitz

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011, vol. 80, issue 2, 331-338

Abstract: Elements of the Chicago and Virginia traditions of political economy have rejected both competitive money production and money's politicization via post-constitutional bargaining, opting instead for constitutionalization. This paper argues that competitive money production is not subject to the pro-cyclicality that concerns constitutional political economy. It also meets the standard of predictability that motivates constitutional perspectives, although at the level of individual prices rather than the price level. An effective monetary constitution is implicit in any constitution that protects rights to property, contract, and exchange and sets limits on the democratic process.

Keywords: Constitutional political economy; Monetary regimes; Free banking; inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:2:p:331-338

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.010

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