Corporate tax evasion: The case for specialists
Vilen Lipatov
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 81, issue 1, 185-206
Abstract:
We analyze the role of accounting specialists who help corporations evade/avoid taxes in a game of incomplete information played by a tax authority, corporate taxpayers, and an accounting specialist. In addition to a full equilibrium characterization, we establish that (i) marginal changes in enforcement are not effective when evasion/avoidance is pervasive; (ii) fines on firms as opposed to specialists are more effective in such situations; (iii) reducing auditing costs and increasing “creative accounting” costs are effective in curbing evasion when tax compliance is relatively high.
Keywords: Tax evasion; Tax avoidance; Tax compliance; Sophisticated evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
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Working Paper: Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:1:p:185-206
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.015
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