EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Betrayal aversion versus principled trustfulness—How to explain risk avoidance and risky choices in trust games

Detlef Fetchenhauer and David Dunning

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 81, issue 2, 534-541

Abstract: Are decisions in a trust game more or less sensitive to changes in risk than decisions in a purely financial, non-social decision-making task? Participants in a binary trust game (they could either keep $5 for sure or give it to a trustee with the chance of getting $10 back) were informed that their chance of interacting with a trustworthy person was either 46 percent or 80 percent and then were asked to decide whether to trust that other person. In addition, participants made a decision in a lottery (i.e., whether to gamble $5 to win $10) with the same probabilities. In the 46 percent condition, participants were significantly more willing to choose the risky option in the trust game than in the lottery. Overall, the difference in probability of receiving money back had a significantly higher impact on the lottery decision than on the decision to trust. Possible interpretations of the present study and its relation to previous findings are discussed.

Keywords: Trust; Risk taking; Economic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268111002009
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:534-541

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.017

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:534-541