Sequential Internet auctions with different ending rules

Toshihiro Tsuchihashi

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 81, issue 2, 583-598

Abstract: Two ending rules, a soft close and a hard close, exist in Internet auctions. The hard close auction involves a fixed deadline, while the deadline in the soft close auction may be extended if at least one bid is submitted in the final few minutes. Thus, the soft close allows buyers to submit ofter observing the opponent's bids even in the last minutes. Ending rules change both the seller's and the buyers’ strategies. In a sequential auction with the soft close, buyers have a stronger incentive to wait for low reserve prices in the future, and a seller chooses lower reserve prices.

Keywords: Internet auction; Ending rule; Reserve price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:583-598

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.08.002

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