Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 81, issue 2, 606-612

Abstract: The most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual, so that individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied. Both ex ante and ex post fairness can be satisfied but then the individual does not have well defined preferences over own lotteries.

Keywords: Fairness; Risk; Ex-ante fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)

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Working Paper: Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:606-612

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.004

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