An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games
Andreas Leibbrandt () and
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 84, issue 3, 753-766
This paper explores the motivations behind punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subjects design in ten simple games. We apply a classification analysis and find that a parsimonious model assuming that subjects are either inequity averse or selfish best explains the pattern of punishment from both third and second parties. Despite their unaffected position, we find that many third parties do not punish in an impartial or normative manner.
Keywords: Fairness; Inequity aversion; Norms; Punishment; Reciprocity; Third parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:84:y:2012:i:3:p:753-766
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