Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede Game

Astrid Gamba ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 85, issue C, 112-117

Abstract: Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are observable. We present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the Centipede Game, where we adopt self-confirming equilibrium to capture behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable.

Keywords: Preferences; Altruism; Evolution; Learning; Self-confirming equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D64 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:85:y:2013:i:c:p:112-117

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.11.009

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