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Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace

Luis Corchon and Anil Yildizparlak

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 92, issue C, 116-126

Abstract: We study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource. War is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries – under complete or asymmetric information – when there is no pre-established distribution of the resource among countries. When there is such a distribution of the resource, under complete information peace is feasible for some initial distributions of the resource, whereas under asymmetric information there are two classes of equilibria: Peaceful Equilibria, in which peace has a positive probability, and Aggressive Equilibria, which assign probability one to war. Surprisingly, a little asymmetric information may yield war.

Keywords: Peace; War; Asymmetric information; Contests; Litigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:92:y:2013:i:c:p:116-126

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.013

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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