The royal lie

Mareike Hoffmann, Thomas Lauer and Bettina Rockenbach

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 93, issue C, 305-313

Abstract: According to the Greek philosopher Plato “[…] if anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying the rulers of the State […] may be allowed to lie for the public good” (The Royal Lie). To investigate whether The Royal Lie may foster cooperation in public goods provision we experimentally study centralized manipulations of contribution feedback. We find that a uniform feedback exaggeration does not increase cooperation and is disapproved once it is disclosed. An individual exaggeration, however, that gives nobody the feeling of being a sucker sustains cooperation on a high level.

Keywords: Public goods provision; Feedback manipulation; Lying; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:305-313

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.020

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