Fooling the Nice Guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with lying and punishment

Bernd Irlenbusch and Janna Ter Meer

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 93, issue C, 321-327

Abstract: We demonstrate that receiver credulity can be understood through a false consensus effect: the likelihood with which individuals believe messages about the behavior of others can be explained by their own behavioral tendencies in a comparable situation. In a laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which feedback on actual contributions is obscured. Instead, subjects communicate what they have contributed through a post hoc announcement mechanism. Using subjects’ social value orientation as a proxy for their contribution tendency, we show that those high on the measure have inflated beliefs about the contribution of others. This, in turn, impacts their contribution and punishment decisions.

Keywords: Public goods; Punishment; Lying; Receiver credulity; False consensus effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:321-327

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.023

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