Cheating in mind games: The subtlety of rules matters

Ting Jiang

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 93, issue C, 328-336

Abstract: This paper employs two variants of the “mind game” to show how a subtle variation in the game's rules affects cheating. In both variants of the game, cheating is invisible because subjects make their choices purely in their minds. The only difference stems from the ordering of steps that subjects are instructed to follow when playing the game. The order of play has a significant impact on cheating behavior, even though the rules cannot be enforced.

Keywords: Cheating; Mind game; Rule design; Moral image; Decision time (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 H26 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (86)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811300098X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:328-336

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.003

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().