Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection

Seungjin Han

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, vol. 99, issue C, 85-95

Abstract: This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection when multiple buyers (e.g., entrepreneurs with risky projects) non-exclusively contract with multiple firms (e.g., banks). It shows that any price schedule can be supported as equilibrium terms of trade in the market if each firm's expected profit is no less than its reservation profit. Firms sustain collusive outcomes through the triggering trading mechanism in which they change their terms of trade contingent only on buyers’ reports on the lowest average price that the deviating firm's trading mechanism would induce.

Keywords: Collusion; Non-exclusive contracting; Competing mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection (2013)
Working Paper: Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:99:y:2014:i:c:p:85-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.013

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