Banking crisis and bank supervisory accountability

Vahe Lskavyan

Journal of Economics and Business, 2020, vol. 107, issue C, No S0148619519300177

Abstract: The accountability of bank supervisors to the executive and the legislative branches of the government varies across countries and over time. Using cross-country panel data, we explore whether a banking crisis can affect these accountability arrangements. According to our results, supervisory accountability to the executive branch only becomes more likely following a banking crisis. Our contribution is to the nascent but important literature on the governance of bank supervisors.

Keywords: Banking crisis; Bank supervision; Supervisory accountability; Legislature; Executive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:107:y:2020:i:c:s0148619519300177

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2019.105863

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