A different view on acquisition paradox: Empirical examination of international acquisitions from competitiveness perspective
Omer F. Genc and
Dan Luo
Journal of Economics and Business, 2024, vol. 130, issue C, No S0148619524000249
Abstract:
Acquisitions are complex strategic decisions and there is not a consensus about the outcomes of them. The complexity and the implications increase with international acquisitions (IA). We examine international acquisitions from a different perspective to see how they affect competitiveness of acquires using a sample of international acquisitions by U.S. firms applying a control sample methodology. Competitiveness outcomes of IAs vary based on the dimension used. They result with lower financial performance, profitability and productivity whereas have a positive effect on market power and innovation of acquirers. Negative performance is consistent with the general belief about agency theory, but our findings also provide support for the resource-based view of enhanced competitiveness. Regarding the success factors, we show that capabilities of acquirers matter more than their resources in explaining post-acquisition competitiveness of acquirers. Acquirers with greater acquisition experience benefit a lot more from IAs compared to firms without acquisition experience. We also show that relatedness of acquirer and target is crucial for creating synergies and efficiencies in terms of enhanced productivity.
Keywords: International mergers and acquisitions; International competitiveness; Firm resources and capabilities; International corporate investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:130:y:2024:i:c:s0148619524000249
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2024.106182
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