Venture capital and the incorporation decisions of IPO firms

Thomas J. Boulton

Journal of Economics and Business, 2010, vol. 62, issue 6, 477-501

Abstract: This paper investigates whether IPO firms backed by venture capital investors are more likely to incorporate in states that are takeover friendly. Venture capital firms benefit when their portfolio companies are subject to the discipline of the corporate control market. State-level antitakeover statutes diminish the effectiveness of the corporate control market by making firm acquisition more costly. I find that venture capital-backed IPO firms are more likely to incorporate in a takeover-friendly state, such as Delaware. State-level antitakeover statutes are effective takeover deterrents, as my results show that firms incorporated in takeover-friendly states are more likely to be acquired in the five years following their IPO. I also find that firms incorporated in takeover-friendly states have higher Tobin's Q values than firms incorporated in takeover-unfriendly states, suggesting that state-level antitakeover statutes negatively impact firm value.

Keywords: Governance; Initial; public; offering; State; of; incorporation; Venture; capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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