Second-best optimality of advertising when monopoly is sanctioned

Richard Just and Rulon D. Pope

Journal of Economics and Business, 2012, vol. 64, issue 6, 393-398

Abstract: Monopoly pricing is sanctioned by government in a variety of cases (e.g., patent policy). We derive necessary and sufficient conditions on preferences determining when monopolists choose socially optimal, excessive, or inadequate advertising conditional on monopoly pricing behavior. We then derive the behavioral implications of these conditions in an empirically tractable framework that is estimable with typical observable data.

Keywords: Advertising; Excessive advertising; Monopoly pricing; Optimal advertising; Social optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148619512000434
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:64:y:2012:i:6:p:393-398

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2012.08.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics and Business is currently edited by Emanuele Bajo and Moritz Ritter

More articles in Journal of Economics and Business from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().