The market for CEOs: An empirical analysis
Varouj Aivazian,
Tat-kei Lai and
Mohammad M. Rahaman
Journal of Economics and Business, 2013, vol. 67, issue C, 24-54
Abstract:
We investigate empirically a market-based explanation for the rise in recent years in external CEO hiring and compensation and find, consistent with the market-based theory, that firms in industries relying on general managerial skills are more likely to hire CEOs externally than firms in industries relying less on such skills. We show that firms relying on internal CEOs have on average higher profits than external-CEO firms and that the difference in profits decreases as general skills become more important in the industry. We relate managerial skills to compensation and show that CEO general skills induce better firm performance and higher compensation.
Keywords: CEO turnover; CEO skills; CEO compensation; General skills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 J40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:67:y:2013:i:c:p:24-54
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2013.02.001
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