 Interjurisdictional externalities, overlapping policies and NOx pollution control in SwedenJessica Coria, Magnus Hennlock and Thomas Sterner Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2021, vol. 107, issue C Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the effects of the interaction between national and local policies designed to reduce an environmental externality that causes environmental damages both nationally and locally. We formulate a theoretical model to develop hypotheses regarding the combined effects of such policies on the stringency of the local policies and on firms’ emissions reductions. To test our hypotheses, we use actual data for Sweden, where emissions of nitrogen oxides from combustion boilers are subject to a heavy national tax and most are also subject to individual emissions standards set by county authorities. Our analytical findings suggest that the national tax has brought along stricter emission standards. This is confirmed in our data, where emission standards are significantly more stringent when combined with the national tax. Keywords: Environmental regulation; Multi-governance; Federalism; Emission taxes; Command-and-control; Air pollution; NOX; Sweden (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:107:y:2021:i:c:s0095069621000279 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102444 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Environmental Economics and Management is currently edited by M.A. Cole, A. Lange, D.J. Phaneuf, D. Popp, M.J. Roberts, M.D. Smith, C. Timmins, Q. Weninger and A.J. Yates More articles in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.