Do green parties affect local waste management policies?
Augusto Cerqua,
Nadia Fiorino and
Emma Galli
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2024, vol. 128, issue C
Abstract:
We explore whether mayors supported by pro-environmental parties enhance local environmental outcomes compared to their non-environmental counterparts. We study close elections within a regression discontinuity design and find a notable rise in recycling rates in Italian municipalities governed by pro-environmental coalitions. This uptick becomes far less pronounced when adopting broader criteria to define green mayoral candidates. Crucially, the enhanced recycling rates are not realized through augmented budgets for environmental initiatives or waste collection, but rather are primarily attributed to the implementation of local policies, such as on-call waste collection and the establishment of waste collection centers.
Keywords: Politicians; Green parties; Partisan politics; Environmental policies; Political economy; Regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 H7 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:128:y:2024:i:c:s009506962400130x
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103056
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