Environmental protection for bureaucratic promotion: Water quality performance review of provincial governors in China

Liguo Lin, Wei Sun and Jinhua Zhao

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2024, vol. 128, issue C

Abstract: We show including quantitative environmental targets for bureaucratic promotion incentivizes government officials to enforce environmental regulation but at significant economic costs. Taking advantage of the gradual expansion of China's water quality performance review (WQPR) over time and space, we find that WQPR significantly reduced ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants, digestive cancer mortality, and GDP growth rate. WQPR's effects are more pronounced along provincial borders, which are targeted by WQPR, and when provincial governors have more promotion potential. An important mechanism is investment in wastewater treatment facilities. There is evidence that WQPR passed the benefit-cost test, especially in rural areas.

Keywords: Water quality performance review; Imperfect enforcement; Bureaucratic promotion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q56 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:128:y:2024:i:c:s0095069624001347

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103060

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