EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Remanufacturing

Sophie Bernard ()

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 337-351

Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.

Keywords: Remanufacturing; Competition; Environmental regulation; Porter Hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611000933
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Remanufacturing (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:3:p:337-351

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.005

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management is currently edited by M.A. Cole, A. Lange, D.J. Phaneuf, D. Popp, M.J. Roberts, M.D. Smith, C. Timmins, Q. Weninger and A.J. Yates

More articles in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().

 
Page updated 2020-08-29
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:3:p:337-351