Corruption and forest concessions

Gregory S. Amacher, Markku Ollikainen and Erkki Koskela

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2012, vol. 63, issue 1, 92-104

Abstract: We examine how corruption impacts a central government's application of concession policy instruments consisting of royalty rates, concession size, environmentally sensitive logging levels, and enforcement. Harvesters have incentives to illegally log by taking more volume than is allowed, high grading through removal of only the highest valued and best formed trees, and shirking environmentally sensitive logging requirements, all of which reduce public goods produced from native tropical forests. Corruption is introduced through logging inspectors who can be bribed by harvesters to avoid fines associated with illegal logging. Both the theory and a simulation are used to compare policy design under corruption and no corruption.

Keywords: Concessions; Corruption; Bribery; Deforestation; Illegal logging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:63:y:2012:i:1:p:92-104

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.007

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